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Is the gene ‘special’ for historians? What effects, if any, has the notion of the ‘gene’ 
had on our understanding of history? Certainly, there is a widespread public and 
professional perception that genetics and history are or should be in dialogue with 
each other in some way. But historians and geneticists view history and genetics very 
differently – and assume very different relationships between them. And public 
perceptions of genes, genetics, genomics, and indeed the nature and meanings of 
‘history’ differ yet again. Here, in looking at the meaning, and the implications – the 
significance – of the gene (and its corollary scientific disciplines and approaches) 
specifically to historians, I will focus on two aspects of the discourse. First, I will 
examine the ways in which historians have thus far approached genes and genetics, 
and the impact such studies have had on the field. There is considerable overlap 
between the subject matter of genetics/genomics and many of the most widely used 
analytic categories of contemporary historiography – race, gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity, (dis)ability, among others. Yet the impact of genetics and genomics on 
society has been studied principally by anthropologists, sociologists and ethicists.2 
Only two historical sub-disciplines have engaged with the rise of genetics to any 
significant degree: the histories of science and of medicine. What does this indicate or 
suggest? Second, I will explore the impact of the ‘gene’ and genetic understandings 
(of, for example, the body, health, disease, identity, the family, and evolution) on 
public conceptions of history itself. 
 
Decoding genetics: Historical approaches to the gene 
 
“I confess that from my experience as both an historian and someone who writes a 
great deal about current work in genetics, I am sceptical, I would even say biased, 
about claims of a genetic basis for any specific social behaviors.”3 So wrote the 
renowned historian of biology, Garland E. Allen in 1997. If genetics cannot explain 
even the ‘social behaviours’ of individuals, then clearly the gene has little to say about 
history. And Allen’s scepticism about the claims made for genetics as an efficient 
cause or an explanatory system is widely shared by scholars in history, as well as in 
anthropology, sociology, science studies, and indeed the biological and medical 
sciences. But historians, particularly of science and medicine, are more than sceptical 
of the claims of genetic determinists: many are deeply ambivalent or openly 
apprehensive about what has been called the ‘geneticization’ of society. Historical 
studies of genetics reflect – and explain – their unease.  
 
Historians have explored the gene both through studies of its scientific emergence,4 
and through explorations of societal (and economic, and political, and cultural) 
responses to genetic claims, assumptions, and models of human heredity.5 Perhaps 
most disturbingly, historians have examined eugenics movements of the 20th century, 
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including the role of eugenic thinking in the Holocaust, in forced sterilization 
campaigns, and in enabling the other tragic outcomes of negative eugenics 
programmes.6 Eugenics, whether positive or negative, relied on assumptions that 
social traits – for instance, intelligence, industriousness, honesty, but also stupidity, 
laziness, and criminality – as well as physical ones were biologically inherited, and 
governed by genes. The commonsense of their day, these assumptions shaped the 
research designed to test them, and the interpretation of the data produced by those 
trials. Experiments constructed under these circumstances ‘naturally’ validated 
existing beliefs about both marginalized and privileged groups – and the evidence 
they produced was readily accepted as objective despite its poor quality. It is therefore 
unsurprising that historians like Garland Allen and Daniel Kevles are suspicious of 
contemporary scientists’ claims to have found the genes for, say, homosexuality, or 
criminal violence, and fear that eugenic thought continues to underpin genetic science 
and genetic medicine.7 Simply put, historical comparisons suggest ominous 
similarities between these claims and those of their eugenic predecessors. 
 
Other historical approaches have included the study of the gene as a 20th century 
marker of ‘biological determinism’ (tainted in historical terms by its use in 
sociobiology, where ‘biology’ became ‘destiny’ in ways profoundly limiting for 
women, non-whites, and other marginalized groups); and related study of the ways in 
which genetics could facilitate the construction of a normative biology.8 Via 
biography and autobiography, the history of genetics has also yielded exemplary 
accounts of gender bias in modern science.9 All in all, existing historical scholarship 
on the gene and genetics leaves little ground for optimism about the effects of our 
current cultural fascination with hereditarian, geneticized models of human culture 
and human history. The idea that our capabilities, our futures, even our souls are 
encoded in our genes, has historically proven a dangerous one; what risks then are 
likely to lie in seeking to understand ourselves and our pasts through our genes? 
 
In my own historical field, the history of medicine, the impact of the gene and the 
genetic trope on medical research and practice is clearly visible, if as yet relatively 
unexplored – but the influence of genetic understandings of social, cultural and 
historical phenomena extends far more widely. As an example to illustrate the 
problem, consider the congested historical intersection between ideas of race and 
ideas of biological heredity. Jenny Reardon, working in the field of science and 
technology studies, has recently demonstrated (coincidentally displaying the traction 
historians could gain by actively engaging with the anthropological and science 
studies literatures), the polysemic flexibility and consequent durability of the concept 
and category ‘race’ within the scientific disciplines that have focused on heredity, and 
thus genetics.10 These traits make it extremely difficult to pin down, moment by 
historical moment, the meaning of race to scientists and within the scientific 
literatures. As the science of genetics (and subsequently genomics) gained broader 
and wider explanatory powers in relation to human variation, ‘race’ as an explanatory 
model could disappear linguistically, while persisting intellectually: biological and 
medical use of ‘race’ as a category of analysis went, as it were, underground, re-
inscribed in politically neutral terminology. Thus scientists and medical researchers 
could retain the analytical power of ‘race’ without the taint of racism. Many 
prominent post-war scientists explicitly denied biological ‘race’. In severing the direct 
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connection between the life sciences and racial thought, they also disrupted historical 
analyses that have been heavily dependent on the language of science, rather than its 
less accessible and historically documented practices. 
 
This neat solution to the problem of ‘race’ for scientists was pioneered in the 1950s.11 
Today, it persists. On one hand, clinical and research geneticists argue vociferously 
that self-identified race is only a ‘weak surrogate’ for a host of more complicated 
factors in morbidity.12 On the other, popular, commercial, and indeed some public 
health models of disease causation often present a far stronger programme, in which 
biological race determines susceptibility to particular diseases. Even geneticists 
adamant that ‘race’ is at best a proxy for authentic sources and markers of genetic 
difference make assumptions about the (biological and material) nature of those 
hypothetical authentic signs: 
 
On the nongenetic side … race carries with it certain social, cultural, 
educational and economic variables, all of which can influence 
disease risk. On the genetic side … race is an imperfect surrogate for 
ancestral geographic origin, which in turn is a surrogate for genetic 
variation across an individual's genome… Considered in this 
context, it is apparent why self-identified race or ethnicity might be 
correlated with health status, through genetic or nongenetic surrogate 
relationships or a combination of the two. It is also evident that a 
true understanding of disease risk requires us to go well beyond 
these weak and imperfect proxy relationships. And if we are not 
satisfied with the use of imperfect surrogates in trying to understand 
hereditary causes, then we should not be satisfied with them as 
measures of environmental causation either.13 
 
Collins, the science-trained commentator here, makes several key points. He identifies 
the flaws in current exclusively genetic models of race and race-linked morbidity, and 
states that they must be addressed – but note his conservatism, and application of the 
scientific methodology to ‘environmental’ (in other words, social) causation as well: 
“if we are not satisfied with the use of imperfect surrogates in trying to understand 
hereditary causes, then we should not be satisfied with them as measures of 
environmental causation either.” History can tell us much about the implications of 
this kind of gene-thinking, with its stress on absolute certainty and one-to-one 
correlations of cause and effect. Epidemiological data necessarily often document 
proxy relationships, and draw attention to indirect, but nonetheless persuasive and 
relevant links between substances, behaviours and morbidities. Think for example of 
the long-contested status of the link between smoking and lung cancer.14 If only 
‘perfect’ data and direct biological links are to be used in health policy making, the 
public can expect little protection or advice in health matters in the short- or medium-
term. 
 
Collins also cautions: “If only genetic factors are considered, only genetic factors will 
be discovered.” Historically, the dangers of this approach are all too obvious, as the 
cases of sickle cell anaemia and thalassaemia illustrate. Sickle cell anaemia (SCA) 
was first identified as a specific condition in 1910, by Chicago physician James 
Herrick.15 As a rare condition prevalent only in underprivileged minority populations, 
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sickle cell anaemia triggered little clinical or biological interest. By the 1930s, small-
scale studies identified the condition as genetically linked, and better defined its 
pathology, including distinctions between sickle cell disease (SCD) and sickle cell 
trait (SCT).16 By this point, the trend of identifying the disease not by its symptoms, 
but by the cellular phenomenon of ‘sickling’ was already established, as was a 
complete identification of the disease with an ‘African’ origin.17 Stigmatized in the 
US as a sign of African-American ‘racial degeneration’, the presence of SCA in a 
family was taken as irrefutable evidence of ‘Negro blood’ through the 1950s.18 Even 
– perhaps especially – after the specific genetic point mutation that produces 
SCT/SCA had been identified, racialized stigma remained. “What steps are being 
taken”, wrote one British Member of Parliament (well-known for his racist views),
warn the public as a preventive measure that the debilitating genetic disease known a
sickle cell anaemia, not present in the indigenous population of Great Britain, c




19 The same MP sought the 
segregation of the national blood banks. Only in the 1970s did more nuanced 
approaches to SCA and other conditions associated with (but not limited to) specific 
ethnic groups become the norm.20 Today, we are at risk of slipping backward, of 
returning to models in which the presence or absence of the genetic mutations 
associated with sickle cell anaemia or thalassaemia determines ‘race’ or ethnicity, 
trumping family history, self-identification, or pluralist ideas of individual heritage 
and selfhood. 
 
And yet the study of the history of genetics has done much for the histories of science 
and medicine. For example, historians of science concerned with gender (most 
influentially Evelyn Fox Keller and Donna Haraway) have used molecular genetics 
and genomics as sites at which to explore the impact of gender on scientific thought, 
programmes of research, and paradigm-formation. Their work substantially enhanced 
the credibility of gender as a force in the development (and tool for the exploration) of 
the scientific professions, and the content of the sciences themselves. In part through 
this work on the metaphors and constitutive imagery in genetics and genomics, the 
language of science has been recognized as being more than merely didactic. Rather, 
it forms and reveals the intellectual structures through and within which scientists 
conceive their experimental and disciplinary programmes.21 History may have yet 
more to gain through tackling ‘geneticization’ head on; certainly, medical 
anthropology and medical sociology have captured new audiences – particularly in 
relation to health and science policy – through their direct engagement with the 
impact of genetics and genomics on lay attitudes towards health, risk, and identity. It 
seems likely that the discipline of history stands to lose at least some of the ground it 
has gained in terms of inclusivity and accessibility – largely through the growth of 
social history – if we ignore the impact of genetics on popular social and cultural 
understandings of history and the historical. 
 
History through a genetic lens: Genes, genomes, geneticists and the human past 
 
If the media are to be believed, there is a new kind of history out there, one written 
and embedded in the human body itself, and just waiting to be read by genetic and 
genomic scientists. The headline of a 2005 article in the respected UK newspaper The 
Guardian was blunt: “All of human history can be written with four letters”.22 The 
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body of the article itself reveals the tension inherent in this view. On one hand, it 
presents DNA as a historical text that “reveals a lot about human evolution, and some 
family secrets, too.” But only a sentence or two later, the reporter/protagonist 
describes the “piece of paper” which seemingly reveals all: “Among the 
multicoloured lines, the computer-generated graphs and the maps was an innocuous 
string of letters, beginning, GCTTCTCGCG.” This is hardly the transparent window 
onto the past that one might have expected from the breathless narrative that preceded 
it.  
 
Other accounts, leaning heavily on the traditions of sociobiology, ponder the history 
of human survival. Under the headline “Starch ‘fuel of human evolution’”, a BBC 
News story recites a new scientific claim: “Man's ability to digest starchy foods like 
the potato may explain our success on the planet, genetic work suggests.”23 Publicists, 
like journalists, make much of the power of this new discipline (unlike history based 
on documents, oral traditions, or even material culture or archaeological finds) to do 
away with ‘prehistory’ and the ‘prehistoric’. The publishers of one recent book 
confidently asserted: 
 
Historians relying on written records can tell us nothing about the 
99.9 per cent of human evolution which preceded the invention of 
writing. It is the study of genetic variation, backed up by language 
and archaeology, which provides concrete evidence about the spread 
of cultural innovation, the movements of peoples … the precise links 
between races.24 
 
It is worth paying attention to this kind of ephemeral material, I would argue, if only 
because the use of such claims for mass marketing clearly illustrates the perceived 
appeal of a ‘scientific’, objective, and especially, a complete history. 
 
Finally, this genetically inscribed past is presented as a corrective to the errors and 
biases of its more traditional analogue. Consider, for example the now famous role of 
genetics in re-writing the history of the third President of the United States of 
America, Thomas Jefferson. First, in the late 1990s, DNA testing confirmed the oral 
historical traditions of one branch of the Jefferson clan that they were the descendants 
of a child born to Jefferson and his slave, Sally Hemings. Unsurprisingly, given US 
racial politics, these claims had been fiercely denied by Jefferson’s white 
descendants, and ignored as either tendentious or merely contentious by many 
historical texts and textbooks. It is a powerful indicator of the truth status granted by 
our society to ‘genetic’ knowledge that the DNA evidence silenced most (though not 
all) of the dissenting voices that had dominated debate for over 200 years.25 As if to 
confirm claims that human DNA is the ‘archive’ of this new history, the resources 
created to test claims of Jeffersonian paternity have now yielded new ‘facts’, 
including a putative Middle Eastern heritage for Jefferson himself: 
 
While DNA tests carried out ten years ago famously showed the 
third US president Thomas Jefferson fathered a child with his slave, 
Sally Hemings, a new study has found his family comes from the 
Middle East. Experts at the University of Leicester found Jefferson's 
Y chromosome belongs to the rare 'K2' class, found in Egypt – and 
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introduced to Britain thousands of years ago. 26 
 
Neither the original article, nor subsequent coverage supplied any interpretation of 
this new information about Jefferson. Whether this omission suggests that meaning is 
beyond the remit of genetic history, or that the meaning of the concrete evidence it 
supplies is or ought to be a truth self-evident is as yet unclear. 
 
In each of these examples, we see the gene, or clusters of genes acting as a new kind 
of historical evidence, for a new kind of history, a ‘history’ with periodization often 
closer to that of geology than of social or political history. A rapidly growing body of 
(largely popular) work propounds this approach. Their titles are revealing: Mapping 
Human History: Genes, Race, and Our Common Origins; The Great Human 
Diasporas: The History of Diversity and Evolution; Genes, Memes and Human 
History: Darwinian Archaeology and Cultural Evolution.27 This history ignores or 
downplays the evidence and artifacts of culture in favour of molecular biological 
evidence. But just like the poorly or incompletely interpreted document, these 
apparently transparent physical artifacts can easily become meaningless, or even 
deceitful – artifacts in the biomedical, rather than the historical sense. Henry Louis 
Gates Jr, eminent Harvard scholar of African American literature, and an early 
enthusiast of the new history, was also an early victim of its flaws.28 In 2000, having 
“come to the end of the paper trail” in his search for the African roots of his own 
family – in other words, having run out of conventional historical sources – Gates 
submitted his DNA for genetic testing, and was promised and then provided with 
definitive results pinpointing the geographical origins of his ancestors. So far, so 
good: geneticized history steps in to save the day when historical scholarship fails. 
Unfortunately, some time later, Gates took another DNA test, and was given different 
results. Instead of rejecting the approach that had left him with multiple identities, 
Gates founded a company to do it better, by incorporating more traditional historical 
methods. When interviewed by the Wall Street Journal on the subject, Gates agreed 
that the application of genetics to history was “problematic”; however, he ascribed the 
problems not to the nature of genetic evidence, but to “the reluctance of some 
companies to reveal the complexity of the results.”29  
 
The names of the companies too are telling: DNA Tribes; African Ancestry; 
IdentityGenetics, Inc., and Gates’ own AfricanDNA. Ideas of racial and ethnic 
identity are at the heart of this new industry. The companies are quite explicit both 
abut their target consumer groups, and the relationship between their services and 
‘history’. One corporate spokesperson argued: “For most African-Americans, there is 
no paper trail … we make money, but we see this as a service to a people who have 
been cut off from their history and culture.”30 Surely it behoves historians to examine 
this phenomenon and ask what analytic categories like ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ mean in 
their new context – and why they remain so attractive, when the very science that 
ostensibly underpins ‘genetic history’ claims that race does not exist as a biological 
entity.  
 
One aspect that immediately strikes the historian’s eye is the association between the 
‘Roots’ phenomenon of the 1970s (particularly for African Americans) and the 
emergence of geneticized history. As David Chioni Moore pointed out in 1994, 
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scholars across the humanities have yet to engage with the social and cultural impact 
of Alex Haley’s novel Roots (and the 1970s television series based on it).31 As the 
actor Isaiah Washington noted of his own DNA ancestry test “I remember watching 
‘Roots’ when I was young and it stuck with me. I always wanted to know where my 
ancestors came from before slavery, and here you have the science telling you.”32 
Roots sent a generation of African Americans in search of their origins, with new 
hope that they might find an ancestor, biologically of the same substance, linking 
them directly and authentically to Africa. The controversies about plagiarism, 
fictionalized elements, and fabrications that soon surrounded Roots undermined that 
optimism and highlighted how difficult and dubious historical genealogy could be. 
Not only does genetic testing seem to offer an easier route to discovering a specific 
ancestral identity, but that origin is imbued with the same truth status that we as a 
society grant to scientifically created knowledge of the natural world in general: that 
of uncontestable fact.  
 
Troy Duster, a sociologist who has studied this new marketplace of pasts, noted the 
impact that such tests can have on their recipients’ identities: “People are making life-
changing decisions based on these tests and may not be aware of the limitations”.33 
So why have historians generally ignored this phenomenon in their explorations of th
gene, genetics and genomics? Are we threatened by this new ‘history from below’ (or 
by the encroachments of science)? Or have genes just become the new germs – are we 
merely reproducing the scientific evangelism of our forebears, who sought a germ for 
every sickness just as passionately and unreasonably as we seek a gene for every 
trait?
e 
34  Part of the reason for historical indifference surely lies in the use to which 
geneticized history is currently being put. In 1942, the American ethnologists E. S. 
Craighill Handy and Elizabeth G. Handy tore their eyes away from Hawaiian culture 
long enough to wryly observe their own:  
 
As a pleasant and harmless form of antiquarianism, the study of 
family history, biography, and the tracing of genealogy are tolerantly 
humoured but certainly not seriously honoured by historians and 
scientists. … [F]amily records are considered of no importance to 
the larger world of scholarship and science unless related to the lives 
of distinguished persons.35  
 
The attitude they observed remains a part of historical culture (although thanks to 
social history, we have become considerably more enthusiastic about family records, 
and rather less exclusively concerned with ‘distinguished persons’). But it is only a 
part of the answer. Like many professional historians, I am ambivalent about this 
newer, ‘truer’ – but also narrower – history. Because our society currently gives 
genetic information such a high truth status, we risk being blinded to persistent 
assumptions and prejudices if they are clothed in genetic terms. Anthropologists and 
sociologists are already exemplifying these problems in, for example, studies of the 
new reproductive technologies, and in medical and forensic genetics, but they are 
intimately linked, too, with the tools of ‘genetic history’. As Duster points out, 
 
There is a yet more ominous and troubling element of the reliance 
upon DNA analysis to determine who we are in terms of lineage, 
identity, and identification. The very technology that tells us what 
            Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2008, Vol.4, No.1, pp.12-22 
 
_____________  19 
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.4, No.1 (2008) ISSN: 1746-5354 
© ESRC Genomics Network. 
 
proportion of our ancestry can be linked, proportionately, to sub-
Saharan Africa (ancestry-informative markers) is the same being 
offered to police stations around the [USA] to “predict” or 
“estimate” whether the DNA left at a crime scene belongs to a white 
or black person. This “ethnic estimation” using DNA relies on a 
social definition of the phenotype. ... With the demonstrable skew of 
the incarcerated population over the last few decades along social 
categories of race, African-Americans need to be particularly 
sensitive to the use of phenotype as the starting point for 
understanding genotype.36 
 
Under these circumstances, it becomes the job of historians to point out the fact that 
we are repeating a pattern into which we have slipped before – and with no very 
positive outcome. Phrenological and anthropometric approaches to the modelling of 
race were also once the acme of modern science, and they have been retrospectively 
diagnosed as racist sciences; germ theory and eugenic sociobiology were applied to 
explain every human disease, to the great detriment of those treated with ineffective 
sera, or stigmatized as ‘unfit to breed’ (or ‘lives not worth living’). 
 
Professional historians can also engage with this biological past creatively and 
productively. We need not simply dismiss it as old wine in new bottles. The gene has 
heightened the profile of what might called the historical mindset: the idea that the 
past is connected to the present, shapes it, and also can be revealed by it. While 
researching this piece, I meandered the far-flung tendrils of the web, looking for the 
different kinds of connections being made between the constructs ‘gene’ and 
‘history’. I was stunned to discover so prominent among them this idea that you could 
research your family history through genetic testing. But it casts light on a broader 
problem for the discipline. One difficulty professional historians have had in 
presenting satisfying representations of the past is not unlike the problem 
mathematicians  – and indeed medical geneticists – have in explaining risk: just as 
they say that risk is probabilistic, and thus in individual cases uncertain, we say that 
history and historical outcomes are contingent and relative. Occam’s Razor 
notwithstanding, knowledge-workers tend to enjoy complexity and to see it as 
signifying a richer and more accurate account of reality. But there is a break in the 
narrative flow of cause and effect when things get ‘complicated’. The new genetic 
history bridges that chasm, in part by rooting itself so far in the past that the data have 
already been thoroughly winnowed. Thus another crucial element for historians to 
observe about the ‘genetic turn’ in history is that the ascendance of genetic 
explanations, particularly in relation to human traits and familial morbidity, is a return 
to narrative – albeit a narrative outside of time to all intents and purposes. Here, the 
past is not erased by progress, as is the ideal in many other sciences and scientific 
tropes – but it is encased in amber, reified, self-replicating, and crucially, linear. This 
is by no means a justification for writing poorer, simpler, artificially linear history. 
History is complicated, is contingent, is polysemic – we just have to render that 
complexity comprehensible and satisfying. 
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